While the flights of the Wnght brothers over a century ago have enshnned their names m aeronautical history, only slightly less important are the lawsuits brought forth by the brothers m defense of thetr mvention. From 1906 to 1917 the Wnght brothers mamtatned a successful stranglehold on the development and production of the airplane m the United States. This paper exammes that history, the ensumg litigation, and the impact that the Wnght brothers actions had upon the readiness of the U.S. m World War I.
The Wright Lawsuit
The Wnght brothers were granted a patent by the U.S. Patent Office m 1906 for a flymg machme (U.S. Patent No. 821,393, 1906) . Thts patent was based on the application they had submitted m 1903 that had mcluded a detailed descnption and drawmgs oftherr control system as applied to a glider (Crouch, 1981) . Therr application described wmg warpmg, as well as the entire system that allowed the arrcraft to be controlled m forward flight (Wnght & Wnght, 2011 ) . The Wnghts had also stated m therr application that a feature like ailerons could provtde lateral control (U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission, 2005) . Obtatntng a patent meant that no one could copy the Wnghts' design without therr pemnss1on and without paymgthem a royalty. However, the success of the Wnghts' design, bolstered by Chanute's subsequent publication of therr achievements, proved impossible for other arrcraft designers to ignore. Furthermore, the concept of lateral control was so baste to any arrcraft design that, without it, no arrcraft could have flown successfully (Heppenheimer, 2003) .
Wright and Wright v. the World: A Primer
After the success of the June Bug, the members of Alexander Graham Bell's Aenal Expenment Association designed and built its final arrplane, the Silver Dart. It was the first Amencan arrcraft built by a team other than the Wnght brothers that performed well enough to be considered a practical arrcraft (Goddard, 2003) . Bell told the members that they had not trespassed on the Wnght patent. JAAER, Fall 2013 In the midst of these discussions, Curtiss received a telegram from Augustus Hemng suggesting that the two form a partnership to build airplanes (Shulman, 2002) .
Curtiss unveiled the Aeronautical Society machme, which he called the Golden Flyer, on June 16, 1909 flymg it from Moms Park m the Bronx. To further differentiate his arrplane designs and the Wnghts', he mounted ailerons between the wmgs of the biplane. On July 17, he flew the Golden Flyer for 25 miles and captured the Scientific Amencan Trophy for the second year m a row (Shulman, 2002) . Thts exceeded the Wnghfs patience and Wilbur filed a patent-mfrmgement suit agamst Curtiss on August 16 and another on August 19 seekmg to prevent the Aeronautical Society from flymg the Golden Flyer (Banner, 2008 ). Curtiss' subsequent success at Rheims did little to assuage Wilbur's anger (Brady, 2000) .
The Wrights' Position: A Propositional Fallacy
Because of the expenences and values gamed from therr clergyman father, the brothers could be best described as hyper-vigilant towards those whom they perceived as less ethically bound and therefore likely to steal therr mvention (Howard, 1988) . This mmdset led to the selection of the isolation of Kitty Hawk, the silver pamt of the arrcraft, and the retreat to Dayton -all founded m a belief that the press and public scrutiny would result ma loss of control oftherr design (Brady, 2000) . Orville warned Curtiss on July 20, 1908, "We do not mtend to give permission to use the patented features of our machines for exht"bitions or m a commercial way. [ ... ] If it is your desire to enter the Page9 9 Freiwald: The Wright Lawsuit
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The Wright Lawsuit exhibition bus1Dess, we would be glad to take up the matter of a license to operate under our patents for that purpose" (Wnght & Wnght, 2011, p. 907) . Clearly, the Wnghts saw their patent applymg to all airplane flight as a consequence of their successful design (Banner, 2008) . This belief was so broadly applied that it led to an unnamed Curtiss employee to remark, "If you Jump ID the arr and flap your hands, the Wnght Brothers will sue!" {White, 2011, para. 1)
As Bradshaw (1992) notes, it is known from the literature that the Wnght's progress was wholly iterative: they did not use the traditional design-build-test feedback loop of a sole-source 1Dventor, they focused on the refinement of components us1Dg knowledge obta1Ded from Chanute and others. No 1Dvention, no scientific discovery, no work of art, no human endeavor happens ID an btstoncal vacuum. There are always other factors -cultural, political, and personal -that 1Dfluence the outcome of a SIDgle event. So it was with the 1Dvention of the airplane. A translation of Lilienthal's Bir4flight as the Basis of Aviation (1911) was discovered ID the Special Collections area of the Embry-Rtddle library with evtdentiary markmgs from the U.S. Court of Clauns 1Ddicating that the book belonged to the Wnghts at the time of its seizure ID 1929, pnma facie evidence that the knowledge that made their first powered flight possible was not entirely self-synthesized. Though the pnnting of the text postdates their first flight the content withm precedes it by a decade and a half.
Unfortunately for Curtiss, when the final verdict came ID 1913 Orville Wnght, now without Wilbur, was the ummstakable WlllDer. With all delays and appeals exhausted, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals ordered Curtiss to cease makmg airplanes with two ailerons that operated strnultaneously m opposite directions (Freudenthal, 1949) . After consulting with Henry Ford, their mutual lawyer encouraged Curtiss to bait Orville to reopen the litigation by dev1s1Dg a new configuration for lateral control us1Dg the Langley aerodrome that hung ID the Smithsoman (Kelly, 1989) . The idea was to persuade the court that Curtiss' plane was based on Langley's design, not on the Wnghts', an attempt that was unsuccessful, but ensured that the case dragged on. Ford's lawyer was able to persuade the court to temporarily stay the old verdict, and the legal challenges began agam (Shulman, 2002) .
The suit finally ended with the start of World War I when the aircraft manufacturers established the Manufacturers' Aircraft Association to coordinate wartime aircraft rnanufactunng ID the United States and formed a patent pool with the approval of the U.S. government Kane, 2003) . All patent litigation ceased automatically and Page 10 royalties were reduced to one percent and the free exchange of 1Dventions and ideas took place among all the arrframe builders. While this arrangement was to have lasted only for the duration of the war, the litigation was never renewed at the end of the war ID 1918. By thts time, Orville had sold his mterest m the Wnght Company to a group of New York financiers and had retired from the busmess (Kelly, 1989) . For the war effort, however, the damage had already been done.
The Effect of the Lawsuit upon the Development of Aviation 10 the United States The aeronautical world m 1918 would be unrecognizable to Wilbur Wnght who had left it only six years earlier. As late as 1914, the worldwide aircraft mdustry employed only a few hundred workers. By 1918, over 350,000 people were dependent upon the new mdustry that had manufactured over 50,000 aircraft as a consequence of World War I (Goddard, 2003) .
By the time the United States had entered World War I, other countnes had pulled far ahead m production. As early as 1913, a year before hostilities commenced on the continent, France appropnated $7 4 million for aviation. By contrast, America's spending of$125,000 approxunated that offiulgaria {Goddard, 2003) . When the assassmation forthe Archduke catapulted the continent mto war there were already several hundred servtceable aircraft available-even if their Illlssion had yet to be well defined.
The United States did not produce any aircraft of its own design for use at the front durmg World War I; nevertheless, the war served as an unpetus for the 1Dfant mdustry and gave several arrcraft companies their start. Most wartime production revolved around the manufacture of trammg aircraft, of the British De Havilland DH-4 bombers and reconnaISsance aircraft, and of aircraft eng1Des, where the automobile compaD1es dominated (Brady, 2000) . Federal policy durmg the war dictated that the government should not rely exclusively on pnvate mdustry for all its aircraft needs as a direct result of the past decade of patent squabbles. Consequently, the U.S. government established the Naval Aircraft Factory (NAF) at the Philadelphia Shipyards to design and produce wartime aircraft as well as serve as a check on mdustry costs and profits. Although mdustry resISted its establishment and its mtrus10n mto the pnvate sector, the NAF succeeded m des1gnmg and producmg a number of naval airplanes. Its production mcluded 50 Curtiss H-16s, and a total wartime production of 183 flymg boats plus spare parts for the craft (U.S. Centenmal of Flight C0Illllllss10n, 2005) .
Conclusion
History ts not especially kmd to the Wnght brothers where the airplane bus10ess is concerned. Therr arrcraft company did not prosper; it struggled along for SIX years until it was finally sold (Kelly, 1989) . Dunng that time, the firm lost its technological lead and Wnght airplanes became hopelessly obsolete. The brothers alienated much of the aviation community with therr patent lawsuits and then, when they won those suits Orville alienated the 10vestors 10 the Wnght Company by refus10g to take full advantage oftherr legal position. Consequently, many htstonans judge Wilbm and Orville Wnght to be as
The Wright Lawsuit 10ept 10 bus10ess as they were brilliant 10 engmeenng. Sadly, therr obstinacy led to a strategic disadvantage for the United States 10 World War I. If the promise to "darken the skies over Germany'' with the "greatest aerial armada ever seen" (Hughes, 1919, p. 897) had been able to be fulfilled one must wonder how many men on both sides of the conflict might have been spared the prolonged misery of the trenches. In this we can see that the real losers of the Wnght lawsuits were not the aviation pioneers but those who would come to depend upon the arrplane as a valued tool 10 the swift prosecution of warfare.+ David Fre1wald is an assistant professor of aerospace and occupational safety at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Umversity Daytona Beach, Flonda.
